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Child labor and the Law: Notes on Possible Pathologies 
 
 
1. The Problem 
Beginning a little over two hundred years ago—from the time of Robert Peel’s  
Factories Act of 2002 in Britain--there have been repeated attempts to use legislative 
action to bring an end to child labor. And one of the more curious features of this 
phenomenon is how often it has beaten the law and persisted or even got worse 
(Nardinelli, 1990). While child labor did, eventually, come to a virtual end in 
industrialized nations, it continues to be widespread in developing countries
1, despite a 
plethora of legal checks. The purpose of this essay is to show that this is one area where 
seemingly reasonable policy interventions can backfire and there are good theoretical 
reasons why that may be so.  
  The policy with which I shall here illustrate the risk of pathological reaction is the 
standard one where a firm is fined a certain amount if it is found employing children. 
India’s  Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, for instance,  has 
precisely such a clause. Section 14 of this Act requires the government to charge a fine 
between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 20,000 from a person or firm found employing children in 
contravention of the provisions of the Act (Government of India, 1986). What will be 
shown here is that a small dose of an intervention of this kind can actually exacerbate the 
problem of child labor. If the fine for employing children is raised, child labor could 
increase for a while before declining. In other words, the response to the policy could be 
inverse-U shaped. Hence, developing countries like India, trying to legislate against child 
labor, has to be careful in its design of the law and in the choice of the size of the 
punishment. Otherwise the law could have the effect opposite to what is intended. 
  This is a purely theoretical paper. The reader may thus wonder if its warning 
needs to be heeded, given that it is not empirically proved. My response to that is to 
observe that (1) there is plenty of empirical support for the main axiom on which the 
analysis here is founded and (2) the negation of the hypothesis put forward here has not 
been empirically demonstrated, either. In other words, the claim that an increase in the 
fine for child labor will cause child labor to decline has not been empirically proved. It is   3
simply taken for granted. The paper demonstrates that there is no reason for this 
presumption. The paper recommends empirical research to investigate the effects of anti-
child labor legislation, and, till that happens, caution about the laws commonly used.       
 
2.  Theory 
  The reason why child labor policy turns out to be intricate is because of the 
somewhat unusual factors that cause child labor in the first place. Child labor is 
intricately linked to poverty. Virtually all the worlds laboring children are located in poor 
countries. In the same developing country, where lots of children work, one would rarely 
find the child of a doctor, lawyer or professor working. The evidence is overwhelming 
that poverty is a major cause of child labor and, typically, parents send children to work 
in order to achieve some minimal level of consumption (see Grootaert and Patrinos, 
1999; Edmonds, 2004; Edmonds and Pavnick, 2004)
2. The counter-intuitive result 
derived in this paper is a consequence of this assumption
3. 
Consider a labor market in which there are several, identical households with each 
household consisting of one adult and m children. Each child produces a fraction ( of the 
labor that an adult can produce. In other words, full time work by one child is equivalent 
to ( units of an adult’s full-time work. I shall assume that the adult always supplies labor 
perfectly inelastically, whereas children work only to the extent that this is necessary to 
achieve a critical subsistence level of consumption for the household. Let s be that critical 
amount of consumption.  
From these assumptions it immediately follows that children will work only when 
adult wage is below s. Let w be the adult wage. If w exceeds s, subsistence consumption 
is achieved without requiring the children work. Note that, given the above assumptions, 
whenever adults and children are found working, it must be the case that, if adult wage is 
w, the wage rate for a child laborer, w
c, will be (w. Otherwise all firms would employ 
only children or only adults.     
                                                                                                                                                 
1 According to latest ILO (2002) estimates there are 186 million child laborers in the world. 
2 It must be clarified that to say that poverty causes child labor is not to deny that child labor can have other 
causes, such as, lack of schooling opportunity or credit, parental illiteracy (see, e.g., Baland and Robinson, 
2000; Emerson and Souza, 2003; Bhalotra and Heady, 2003). 
3 Natural though this assumption is it is at the root of other unexpected results in this area (see Basu, 2000; 
Singh, 2003; Rogers and Swinnerton, 2004)   4
Let us now bring government into the picture. Suppose government announces 
that each time a firm is found employing a child the firm will be fined D rupees. For 
every child employed by a firm, let p be the probability of the firm being caught. In that 
case for every child employed, the firm has an expected punishment cost of pD. Hence, 
unless child wage is less than (w by pD, it does not make sense for a firm to employ 
children. It follows that the relation between child and adult wage will be:  
w
c  = (w – pD.         (1) 
I refer to the variables p and D as the ‘governmental variables,’ since these are chosen by 
government.
4
Next, if w falls short of s, the household will send the children out to work. Let e 
, [1, m] be the number of children that the household sends to work. Since households 
send children to work only so as to be able to reach subsistence, it must be the case that: 
ew
c    =    s – w 
Or, equivalently,    e  =   (s – w)/((w – pD)        (2) 
It follows that as adult wage drops, the household will send more children to 
work. Of course, this cannot go on endlessly since after some time the household will run 
out of children. Then onwards, as w drops there will be no further increase in the supply 
of child labor. Labor supply of each household is, therefore, min{(s – w)/((w – pD), m}.  
One more condition has to be kept in mind. As w falls, w
c will decline as well 
(see (1)); and beyond a point w
c, will cross zero and be negative. This happens when 0 ≥ 
(w – pD. Clearly, when w
c reaches this critical level, parents will stop sending their 
children to work. Working for a zero wage is not much help achieving minimal 
consumption targets. 
Gathering these pieces, we can now describe the household’s child-labor supply 
as a function of adult wage and the governmental variables: 
    e     =     0,      if w ≥ s or 0 ≥ (w – pD    (3) 
         min{(s – w)/((w – pD), m},  otherwise. 
These facts can be captured pictorially, as shown in Figure 1, where the vertical 
axis represents w (adult wage) and the horizontal axis represents labor, measured in adult 
                                                 
4 In a political economy model, these would be the outcome of some political process (see, for instance, 
Doepke and Zilibotti, 2004), but I shall treat these here as exogenous.   5
labor equivalence units. If w is above s, then only the adult will work. Hence, the labor 
supply curve will be vertical as shown by the segment AB. As w drops below s, children 
go out to work, chasing the subsistence target. Hence, the backward bending segment 
BC.  As w keeps falling, there will be a point beyond which there will be no more labor 
to supply. This explains the CF segment.  Finally, as w keeps falling, (w – pD will 
eventually reach zero, and e will then fall back to zero and only the adult will be working. 
Hence, the supply curve of labor now reverts back to the GH segment. The full labor 
supply curve of labor is therefore given by ABCFGH. The sharp corners and angularity 
of the labor supply curve are caused by the simplifying assumptions. With more general 
assumptions the curve would smoothen out. But the main point is that it will have this 
basic feature of bulging out and then shrinking back as the adult wage rate falls.  
  The aggregate supply curve of labor will look the same as this curve, but for a 
horizontal magnification. I shall, therefore, without loss of generality, assume that this 
same curve is the aggregate supply curve of labor.  
Many of the peculiarities of the child labor market with which the literature has 
been concerned, such as the possibility of multiple equilibria (Basu and Van, 1998; 
Swinnerton and Rogers, 1999; Jafarey and Lahiri, 2002) can be constructed by using this 
kind of supply characterization. But that is not the direction I wish to pursue here. To stay 
away from that, let me consider the case where the demand curve is sufficiently elastic so 
that there is only one equilibrium. This is illustrated by the demand curve for labor DD. 
The market equilibrium is given by the point E, where adult wage, w*, is below 
subsistence and there is a small incidence of child labor. 
  My concern here is with policy interventions. Consider the case where the 
government, starting from the case illustrated in Figure 1, raises the fine for employing 
children. (We could, also, think of a switch from no fine to some positive fine.) Let the 
new fine be D’ and, we are assuming that D’ exceeds D. The effect of this on the supply 
curve of labor is easy to work out. It is obvious that the segment BC will move up, to 
BC’, as shown. To understand this, suppose adult wage is fixed at w*. As the fine for 
child labor is raised, child wage will drop. Hence, each household will be forced to 
supply more children to the labor market in order to reach the subsistence target s.   6
Keeping in mind that e cannot exceed the total available child labor and e will be 
zero if w is less than pD’/(, it is evident that the new supply curve of labor is given by 
ABC’F’G’H in Figure 1.  
  The important property is that for some wage levels, namely, between s and 
pD’/(, the higher penalty for child labor increases the supply of child labor. And this 
leads to the pathological reaction that I discussed earlier, to wit, that child labor will 
increase as a consequence of a higher penalty for employing children:  
  To trace the full range of possibilities, continue to raise D. Clearly child labor will 
rise, and then fall, eventually reaching zero. If, for instance, D is so high that pD/( 
exceeds, s, then the supply curve of labor becomes a vertical line through point H and so 
child labor must be zero in equilibrium. 
 
3. Three Remarks 
  3.1 The household’s behavior described in the model can be deduced from the 
more standard formulation of an optimizing household. To see this, let X be the set of all 
triples, (c, K, L), such that c , [0, 4), 1 – e / K , [0, 1], and 1 - E / L , [0, 1], where c is 
(as before) total household consumption, K is the leisure enjoyed by the children of the 
household and L is the leisure enjoyed by the adult, with E being the work done by the 
adult. Each household has a binary preference ordering on X and the household’s aim is 
to maximize the preference by choosing (c, K, L) such that the triple belongs to its budget 
set defined by c = (1-K)w + (1-L)w
c . 
  I shall now define a preference ordering that will generate the behavior described 
in the previous section. Let each household’s preference ordering, š, be described as 
follows
5. For all (c, K, L) and (c’, K’, L’), if c ≥ s and s > c’, or c ≥ s, c’ ≥ s and K > K’, 
or s ≥ c > c’, then (c, K, L) ™ (c’, K’, L’). If none of the above conditions is true, then  
(c’, K’, L’) š (c, K, L). 
  It is easy to check that maximizing the above preference will lead to adults 
working as long as adult wage is non-negative and child labor supply responding to 
changes in w precisely as described in Figure 1. 
                                                 
5 I use ™ and - to denote the asymmetric and symmetric counterpart of š.   7
  3.2 Since the child labor problem is made worse by the imposition of a fine for 
employing children, it is natural to wonder if it would not be the case that the problem of 
child labor can be mitigated by subsidizing firms for employing children. The answer is 
no. A subsidy does not work like the reverse of a tax or a penalty.  
To see this we must understand what was implicit in the previous section. 
Suppose that a firm decides to use C units of child labor. Clearly it can do this by 
employing different numbers of children. It can, for instance, employ 2C children with 
each child doing half-time work or C children with each child working full time. In most 
models of economics, it does not matter how the total is broken up. In the above model, 
with a penalty for every child that is found working in the firm, a firm will have a 
preference for employing as few children as possible.  So if the firm decides to have C 
units of child labor and gets this from n children, then the cost (wage bill plus expected 
penalty) is given by w
cC + npD. Clearly, it will try to make n as small as possible; hence 
n will be C.
6  
The trouble with a subsidy for employing children is that this implicit assumption 
(which is valid when there is a fine associated with child labor) in the above model breaks 
down. In the presence of a subsidy for each child employed it will be in the interest of the 
firms to get the same volume of labor from many children and take these children to the 
local government office as proof of child labor and collect the subsidy.  
3.3 Finally, it is worth emphasizing, as I have cautioned elsewhere, that a decline 
in child labor need not always coincide with a rise in child welfare. Hence, if one is 
trying to maximize welfare, one may choose not to punish child labor. That is however 
not the point that was being made in this paper. Here we were not concerned with 
welfare, but simply the incidence of child labor and what was demonstrated was that, 
even from the point of view of this limited objective, certain obvious policy deterrents 
may not be worth using.  
                                                 
6 I am assuming that a child’s probability of getting caught depends simply on whether or not a child works 
and not on how much she works. The analysis would go through with a less extreme assumption.   8
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